The Journal of Finance Forthcoming Article Abstract

Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation
Lucian A. Taylor

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Abstract:
I evaluate the forced CEO turnover rate and quantify effects on shareholder value by estimating a dynamic model. The model features costly turnover and learning about CEO ability. To fit the observed forced turnover rate, the model needs the average board of directors to behave as if replacing the CEO costs shareholders at least $200 million. This cost mainly reflects CEO entrenchment rather than a real cost to shareholders. The model predicts shareholder value would rise 3% if we eliminated this perceived turnover cost, all else equal. In addition, the model helps explain the relation between CEO firings, tenure, and profitability.




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