Deposit Insurance and the Discount Window: Pricing under Asymmetric Information

  • Author(s): GEORGE KANATAS
  • Published: Apr 30, 2012
  • Pages: 437-450
  • DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb05047.x

ABSTRACT

The risk‐sensitive pricing of deposit insurance and the discount window is determined in an environment where banks have private information concerning their financial conditions. The two facilities are managed jointly; an incentive‐compatible policy is designed such that banks' choice of terms at which they can obtain insurance and access to discount window credit will reveal their asset quality. The function of the discount window is to be a risk‐neutral “lender of last resort” to banks in a market dominated by risk‐averse depositors.

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