Incentive Conflicts, Bundling Claims, and the Interaction among Financial Claimants

  • Author(s): CHESTER S. SPATT, FREDERIC P. STERBENZ
  • Published: Apr 30, 2012
  • Pages: 513-528
  • DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04725.x

ABSTRACT

We show that for certain capital structures equity has an incentive to buy out another claim and alter the firm's investment strategy so as to maximize the combined value of equity and the acquired claim. This restructuring may reintroduce agency problems into capital structures which appear to avoid agency conflicts. By bundling claims, it is possible to avoid this agency problem. The agency problem is also eliminated by dispersed ownership of the claims.

Jump to menu

Main Navigation

Search the Site / Journal

Search Keywords

Search Tips

Members' Login

Credentials

Members' Options

Site Footer

View Mobile Version